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ABSTRACT 
This discussion paper proposes that a meaningful distinction between science and technoscience can 
be found at the level of the objects of research. Both notions intermingle in the attitudes, intentions, 
programs and projects of researchers and research institutions – that is, on the side of the subjects of 
research. But the difference between science and technoscience becomes more explicit when 
research results are presented in particular settings and when the objects of research are exhibited 
for the specific interest they hold. When an experiment is presented as scientific evidence which 
confirms or disconfirms a hypothesis, this agrees with traditional conceptions of science. When 
organic molecules are presented for their capacity to serve individually as electric wires that carry 
surprisingly large currents, this would be a hallmark of technoscience. Accordingly, we propose 
research on the ontology of research objects. The focus on the material presence of research objects 
makes this a specifically philosophical project. 
 Alfred Nordmann took the lead in drafting this paper, corresponding author is Astrid Schwarz.1
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Das Wesen des Erkennens fordert schlechthin, daß derjenige, der es ausüben will, 
sich in eine Ferne und eine Höhe über die Dinge begebe, von der aus er ihre 
Beziehung zu allen anderen Dingen überblicken kann. Wer sich ihnen nähert, 
teilnimmt an ihrem Weben und Wirken, der steht im Leben, nicht im Erkennen; 
ihm zeigen die Dinge das Antlitz ihres Wertes, nicht ihres Wesens. 
By its very nature knowing demands that the one who seeks knowledge assumes a 
distance and elevation above the things from which one can survey their relations 
to all other things. Whoever gets closer to them and participates in their agency 
and efficacy, partakes in life and not in knowledge; face to face with the things 
one beholds their value and not their nature. 
(Schlick 2009, p. 288) 
The founder of the Vienna Circle articulates a conception of knowledge and science that not only 
expresses a particular self-understanding of the sciences but that left a lasting imprint on the 
philosophy of science. His General Theory of Knowledge provides a requirement of how things 
must appear in order to be objects of knowledge and objects of scientific experience. Some 
scientific research is purely observational, other kinds of research involve close experimental 
engagement with the things, but in both cases, knowledge can be obtained only if the scientists step 
back far enough from the experiment to discern relevant factual relations that disclose the nature of 
things, for example, their regular exhibition of dispositional behaviors. 
 This conception of science did not originate with Schlick and the Vienna Circle. It is part of a     
tradition that began long before them and that is still with us today. The rhetoric of discarding as 
non-scientific the “practical arts” like pharmacy, medicine and engineering, today’s materials 
research, nano- or biotechnologies can be found, for example, in William Whewell’s Novum 
Organum Renovatum: “Whatever place in human knowledge the Practical Arts may hold, they are 
not Sciences. And it is only by this rigorous separation of the Practical from the Theoretical, that we 
can arrive at any solid conclusions respecting the nature of Truth” (Whewell 1858, p. 134). 
Following Whewell’s or Schlick’s lead, philosophers of science had a lot to say about truth and 
representation, hypothesis and reality, hypothesis-testing and theory-choice – and little to say so far 
about scientific research that seeks to control phenomena and master complexity and that does not 
issue in propositions that can be true or false and that describe the facts from some distance or 
elevation. 
  There is increasing recognition of late that there has always been and continues to be a great deal    
of research, including the most highly prized research of today, that engages the things, participates 
in their agency and establishes their value (e.g. Carrier/Nordmann 2010; Chang 2004). It establishes 
novel properties that might be functionalized in certain ways, it exhibits valuable behaviors or 
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performances, and it seeks to master complexity and to control processes and phenomena. Research 
of this kind can be called “technoscientific” research. Accordingly, one major difference between 
science and technoscience might be how things appear as objects of research. This is an ontological 
difference. The following programmatic reflections invite philosophers of science and 
technoscience to engage with this question of ontology – not only in order to appreciate the 
difference between science and technoscience but also to draw their attention toward neglected 
epistemological, methodological or ontological dimensions of research.  This is an invitation, quite 2
literally, since it marks the beginnings of a longer-term research-project. At the beginning and in 
this paper, guiding questions can be posed and philosophical claims motivated. If these provoke 
dissent or do not appear sufficiently clear as yet or seem to require more extended case studies, we 
welcome a critical exchange about this. 
I.  TOWARDS A PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOSCIENCE 
Whether the distinction between science and technoscience needs to be taken seriously is an open 
question for philosophers. For many it coincides with the familiar difference between pure and 
applied science. Others object to the notion of “technoscience” because there has always been a 
close interaction between science and technology, between representing and intervening (Hacking 
1983). If technical intervention amounts to a necessary condition of all knowledge production in 
modern science, so they maintain, it cannot serve to distinguish scientific and technoscientific 
knowledge production (e.g. Boon, forthcoming). This objection misses the point, however, if 
experimental practice and technological tinkering are considered only so as to add the necessary 
detail to a standard picture of science according to which science aims for truth or empirical 
adequacy. If instruments and experimental practice are considered solely for the purpose of 
understanding how theoretical knowledge is produced and validated, science is still distinct from 
technology, let alone engineering. Here, then, the interplay of representing and intervening 
underwrites a familiar conception of science and does not capture “technoscience.” The latter notion 
suggests that science is not distinct from engineering, that the knowledge produced is at the same 
time theoretical but technical. 
 We begin by reviewing some of the more principled arguments for a distinction between science     
and technoscience, allowing that the proof of the pudding will lie in the eating, that is, in the 
!  Funded by the French and German Research Councils, ANR and DFG, the project “Genesis and Ontology of 2
Technoscientific Research Objects” is set to develop a number of case studies in a larger collaborative setting. For more 
information see www.philosophie.tu-darmstadt.de/goto.
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philosophical work that can be done with the help of this distinction – for example, regarding the 
ontology of research objects. “Technoscience” is not the missing ingredient to a more rounded 
image of science, it is not a disciplinary label that picks out a subset of the sciences, nor is it science 
contaminated by extraneous intentions, interests, or application pressures. But what is it then?  
 If “technoscience” is not descriptive of a particular subset of the sciences, there can be scientific     
and technoscientific accounts of the very same research practices, and these accounts can inform 
each other in productive ways. Instead of being classificatory, then, the terms “science” and 
“technoscience” designate guiding ideals or research orientations that shape practice in different 
ways even within the same fields of research (Bensaude-Vincent 2009, Nordmann 2011). Explicitly 
and implicitly, philosophers of science have been articulating what “science” is and how it orients 
research to a variety of epistemic ideals. We might therefore begin by briefly reconstructing the 
much shorter history of “technoscience” and how it orients research to technical ideals.  
 Gilbert Hottois coined the term in 1984 and used it to refer to science that is done in a     
technological setting or milieu and that is technology-driven (Hottois 1984). Accordingly, the term 
technoscience has some affinity to techno-music where the sounds cannot be separated from the 
technological context in which they are produced – as opposed to the musical score of a classical 
piece. Along these lines, Bruno Latour employed the term “technoscience” initially as shorthand for 
and fusion of “science-and-technology,” that is, as a technology/science hybrid where the two 
cannot be separated out from one another in terms of basic and applied research (Latour 1987). 
According to these definitions, “technoscience” is an alternative to “science and technology” with 
its assumption that science and technology are distinct but interacting spheres. Instead of discussing 
in detail how the term has been used by Gilbert Hottois, Bruno Latour, Donna Haraway, Katherine 
Hayles, Don Ihde, Isabelle Stengers, Raphael Sassower, and many others,  we need to develop 3
further just what is implied by the “scientific” idea that science and technology are separate but 
interacting spheres – and what is implied by the “technoscientific” surrender of this claim. 
 The very term “technoscience” exposes that the distinction between science and technology is     
not at all self-evident. Indeed, when one looks through a telescope, prepares a sample, controls for 
artifacts, produces an effect, or sets up a field experiment, it requires considerable care to 
distinguish science and technology. Accordingly, when philosophers and scientists separate out 
these spheres, this involves further divisions such as those between nature and artifice, between the 
representation of a given world and intervention into the lifeworld, between nature and culture, 
 Hottois 1984 and 2002a ; Latour 1987; Haraway 1997; Hayles 2004 ; Ihde/Selinger 2003; Sassower 1995; Stengers 3
2010.
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between pure theoretical knowledge and the practical control of complex situations. The conceptual 
work of separating out these interrelated domains has been called a work of purification because it 
yields the ideas of pure science and pure theory and also yields a notion of nature as something 
prior to and independent of culture. The view of “science” as a primarily intellectual enterprise of 
gaining understanding of an already given world has resulted from this remarkably successful work 
of purification. Inversely, we might define that we encounter technoscience when this work of 
purification is abandoned because it proves impossible or unnecessary. While this is not the only 
way of defining science and technoscience, and perhaps not even the best way of doing so, these are 
the definitions we adopt for the purpose of this programmatic paper: Both science and 
technoscience involve an interplay of representing and intervening. Science is defined by its 
orientation to the epistemic ideal of purification, that is, of separating out as clearly as possible what 
the scientists contribute and what belongs to a given world or mind-independent reality: scientists 
bring concepts and theories and measurement-techniques and experimental interventions but 
presumably all these serve to register something that exists or a “natural” response to an 
experimental stimulus.  Technoscience is defined by its neglect or abandonment of this work of 4
purification. It does not pursue it either because it appears to be impossible and a futile exercise 
from the get-go, or because it is taken to be unnecessary if not nonsensical. Since this definition of 
technoscience is only negative, in order to mark the contrast to science, it requires further 
elaboration. 
 According to the first half of this definition of technocience the work of purification can appear     
to be impossible – in light of certain conditions, even the attempt of doing so is doomed from the 
start. Technoscience is therefore a kind of research where theoretical representation and technical 
intervention cannot be held apart even in thought. In the case of laboratory experiments this means 
that it may not only always be possible to distinguish for an observed effect the contribution by the 
researchers with their instrumental apparatus from the contribution of nature. Even though 
experimental design often serves to ensure that this distinction can be made, it becomes extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, when the observed phenomena and effects appear to be engineered – for 
example, when one studies the “natural” behavior of genetically engineered organisms. This 
difficulty might serve as a criterion to distinguish technoscience from science and, significantly, it 
arises on the side of the research objects. 
 This definition does not make any assumptions as to whether this work of purification ever succeeds, nor does it 4
commit science or philosophy of science to a realist metaphysics. Indeed, the differences and debates between various 
brands of realism, conventionalism, instrumentalism, constructivism arise within the scientific enterprise – they result 
from the question what the work of purification can achieve, and how the “signs of the real” should be interpreted.
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 According to the second half of the definition, we encounter technoscience when the work of     
purification is considered irrelevant and unnecessary. Along these lines Peter Galison proposed the 
notion of “ontological indifference” (Galison 2006, see also Daston and Galison 2007, pp. 393, 
414): For technoscientific research it makes no sense to artificially separate out theory and reality, 
mind and world and only then to relate them to one another. For instance, when biomedical research 
produces a pharmaceutical therapy, there is no interest or there is no reason to separate the 
respective contributions by technology and by nature to the efficacy of the therapy. In contexts like 
these, one wouldn’t expect the phenomenon of interest to be anything but the confluence of natural 
processes and human art.  
 Thus, only as long as the purpose of research is to determine scientifically what is and or isn’t     
really the case, it is crucial to know what is the case independently of what humans think and do – 
caught up in this question, realists, positivists, conventionalists, or constructivists interpret the work 
of science as aiming to represent a relatively mind-independent reality. But when the purpose of 
research is to technoscientifically acquire and demonstrate a capability of control, to make and build 
something, or to show what can be done, it is clear from the start that all of this depends not only on 
what the world is really like but also on what humans think and do. Here it is therefore quite 
unnecessary to juxtapose natural agency and human intervention.  (For those who are looking for 5
the Higgs Boson, the claims of realism or constructivism make a big difference; for those who make 
carbon nanotubes grow and molecules function like machines and motors, there is no question 
here.) While this holds for the engineering sciences, it is characteristic more generally for “an 
engineering way of being in science” or for “research in a design mode” (Galison 2006, Ann 
Johnson in conversation, Nordmann 2010b). These designations might therefore serve as 
equivalents to “technoscience.”  
 Associated with this definition of the technosciences as essentially impure is another general     
feature that has caught the attention of sociologists and policy-makers, in particular. The 
technosciences cannot retreat into a protected disciplinary sphere of facts as distinct from social 
values. This is often put in terms of a “new social contract between science and society” or the 
general statement that the boundaries between science and society have become porous. Indeed, one 
might say that the shortage of philosophical characterizations of technoscience is more than 
 An anonymous reviewer suggested a way of refining the question here that might be especially fruitful for a project 5
dedicated to the ontology of research objects: The question of realism vs. positivism or constructivism arises in respect 
to the problem of reality (Realität) as an object of representation. In contrast, research that engages the agency or 
efficacy of things that function outside the laboratory is interested in actuality (Wirklichkeit). However, some theories of 
reality assume that what is actually and efficaciously the case affords the only “signs of the real” that serve as the 
evidentiary basis for representations of reality. 
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compensated by an abundance of sociological accounts that contrast mode-1 and mode-2 research, 
normal and post-normal science, public and commercialized or entrepreneurial science, academic 
and post-academic science.  While these various sociological accounts often operate with rather 6
superficial distinctions between different modes of research, they complement the juxtaposition of 
science and technoscience in one respect. All these accounts show how research practices and their 
objects are determined by scientific, technical, as well as societal factors. The work of purification 
therefore fails not only in respect to the distinction of representation and intervention but also in 
respect to fact and value, in respect on the one hand to the description and control of the 
phenomena, on the other hand their significance or (promise of) utility.  
 In summary then, these are the ways in which the terms “science” and “technoscience” serve as     
guiding ideals or research orientations that shape practice in different ways even within the same 
fields of research: 
 The ideal of “science” orients the many special sciences towards the acquisition of a kind of     
knowledge that takes the propositional form of theories or hypotheses, of models, explanations, or 
representations. From the point of view of philosophy of science, at least, the main problem for all 
the various sciences is the relation of theory and reality: How can one ascertain the agreement 
between scientific representations and the way things really are in mind-independent reality? 
Arguably, this problem and its many variants are a common denominator of the scientific enterprise 
and they involve an ontological presupposition. Since the scientific representations in question 
typically assume the form of propositions, the world is typically taken to be composed of facts and 
not of things – and a fact is “that something is the case,” “that a thing is so and so,” “that this has 
been observed or measured” etc.  Accordingly, the bridging between theory and reality consists in 7
some arranging of propositions that state facts – be it syntactically and along the lines of 
deductivism or be it by establishing a local fit between model and phenomenon (e.g. de Jong/Betti 
2010). The disciplinary organization of the sciences directs attention to problems, anomalies and 
knowledge gaps in the theoretical description of features of the world.  
 The technoscientific ideal orients the many special technosciences towards the acquisition of a     
kind of knowledge that consists in demonstrable capabilities to control phenomena. These include 
capabilities of visualization, measurement, (simulation)-modeling, intervention and manipulation, 
 See Gibbons et al. 1994; Nowotny et al. 2001; Ziman 2000. For an overview and discussions see Nordmann/Radder/6
Schiemann 2011. 
 Ludwig Wittgenstein, in particular, articulated this ontology: «The world is the totality of facts, not of things.» – «It is 7
essential to a thing that it can be a constituent part of an atomic fact.» – «Objects I can only name. Signs represent them. 
I can only speak of them. I cannot assert them. A proposition can only say how a thing is, not what it is» (Wittgenstein 
1958, 1.1, 2.011, 3.221).
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along with more specific capabilities such as the isolation of gene sequences, the controlled growth 
of carbon nanotubes, the synthesis of new compounds, or the in-vivo observation of a cellular 
process. In this context, experimental interventions are not designed to strategically answer a 
disciplinary question but to elicit surprising, and potentially useful behaviors or properties. These 
experiments uncover the resourcefulness, plasticity and potential for surprise that reside in the 
objects of research. The plasticity of technoscientific objects suggests a different ontology. The 
objects of technoscience are things or processes and their power to surprise, to perform, or to be 
functionalized. They are defined by what they can do, and how they might prove valuable. This, to 
be sure, is only a first approximation to the ontological difference between scientific and 
technoscientific objects. If the proof of the pudding lies in the eating, one way of establishing the 
philosophical fruitfulness of the notion of “technoscience” consists in showing that it affords more 
precise and differentiated analyses also of the ontology of research objects.  
II.  COMPLEMENTARY PERSPECTIVES 
This proposal is an invitation to philosophers of science to take seriously the notion of 
“technoscience” in order to bring to light a range of questions that have been neglected so far even 
in the context of the philosophy of experiment, of modeling, of scientific practice. We suggest that 
the perspective of “technoscience” can stimulate debate not only about the ontology of research 
objects, but also about the role of theory in different contexts of research, about different styles of 
scientific reasoning, about different understandings of technology, about modeling and explanation, 
or about the role of conservation laws in research practice (Bensaude-Vincent 2009, Loeve 2010, 
Nordmann 2010a, Schwarz & Nordmann 2010). 
 If one does not give priority to science or to technoscience but views them as complementary,     
one should expect that both notions intermingle in the attitudes, intentions, programs and projects of 
researchers and research institutions – that is, on the side of the subjects of research. And one 
should also expect that the difference becomes more explicit when research results are presented in 
particular settings and when the objects of research are exhibited for the specific interest they hold. 
The difference between science and technoscience becomes clear, for example, when an experiment 
is presented as scientific evidence which confirms or disconfirms a hypothesis (“science”), and 
when organic molecules are presented for their capacity to serve individually as electric wires that 
carry surprisingly large currents (“technoscience”). It is with this focus on specific material 
articulations rather than the intentions, institutions, economic settings, or goals of research that we 
set apart our philosophical project from sociological or deconstructivist approaches. 
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Whereas the ideal of “science” results from a more or less successful work of purification that can 
always be deconstructed by historians and social theorists of science, Bruno Latour, Donna 
Haraway, or Andrew Pickering consider “technoscience” as the true expression of the real, impure, 
mixed practices of science. By identifying technoscience with the original and authentic character 
of science which has been obscured by the commitment to purity and detached representation, they 
tell a story that inadvertently takes a Hegelian turn. According to this story, 18th to 20th century 
theoretical “science” obscured its Baconian origins and impure practices; it finally came to know 
itself in the age of nuclear weapons and space exploration, of computer science and 
biotechnological research. Only now, science came to understand and fully realize itself as 
technoscience.   8
 While we agree that, for example, contemporary nano- and biotechnological research draws     
attention to the technoscientific character of scientific research practice in general, we do not 
maintain that all of science can be exposed as technoscience, or that the work of purification is a 
futile and meaningless pursuit. Instead, we view as complementary the scientific and 
technoscientific orientations of research and the corresponding perspectives on the research 
practices. To acknowledge this complementarity is to acknowledge the real efficacy and historical 
significance of both perspectives. One perspective places research in the context of progressive 
theory development with its concern for representational correctness, the other perspective 
foregrounds the extension of capabilities of control for human ends. “Science” foregrounds and 
brings to light a primarily intellectual activity that draws on technology for purposes of validation, 
whereas “technoscience” foregrounds and brings to light an artisan or design activity that draws on 
skills, materials, practical and theoretical knowledge to shape and reshape features of the 
world.  Accordingly, both perspectives one-sidedly idealize certain aspects of knowledge 9
production, and in this sense, both are “mythical” – science dedicated to the Enlightenment project, 
 For a critique of this story-line see Rabinow 1997.8
 How do the ways of “foregrounding” different aspects of the same research relate to the distinct definitions of science 9
and technoscience? Take the example of “control.” We stated that the sciences aim for true representations, the 
technosciences for capabilities of control, but we did not use this to define the difference. After all, according to certain 
pragmatist and empiricist accounts of science, one ascertains the correctness or adequacy of a representation by taking 
as evidence a resulting capability to control. According to our definition, then, we notice what we consider the decisive 
difference: In the case of those pragmatist and empiricist accounts of science control validates propositions and is not 
knowledge in its own right. In the case of technoscience, however, control is knowledge in its own right and the task for 
the philosophy of technoscience is to reconstruct the underlying epistemology, notions of validation etc. Having done 
this for technoscience, we can turn back to look at the sciences and ask whether there, too, is operative “under the 
surface,” so to speal, that other epistemology according to which the achievement of control is knowledge in its own 
right, indepedently of whether it validates a proposition. This is how “foregrounding” works and it leaves quite intact, 
of course, the notion that the science are oriented to the ideal of purification and thus to representation and propositions 
that are true or false.
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technoscience to the transgressive power of innovation. Each of these perspectives on research is 
most compelling where it describes just those practices that are most explicitly dedicated to their 
respective mythical ideal. For this reason we aim to explore how idealized notions of science and 
technoscience can shape scientific practice all the way down to the research objects (Bensaude-
Vincent, 2009). As the ideals are worked out in the encounter with real objects, the distinction 
between science and technoscience will become ever more salient.  10
III.  FACTS, OBJECTS, AND THINGS 
The following, very schematic account begins to further articulate the ontology of scientific and 
technoscientific research objects. In the case of science, the ontology of objects turns out to be 
dependent on the ontology of facts.  In the case of technoscience, objects are of interest as things.  11
 The mode of existence of scientific objects is circumscribed by their occurrence in states of     
affairs. Since the existence of a state of affairs is considered a fact, scientific objects are relevant to 
the extent that there are facts about them. And since it has become a philosophical commonplace 
that one cannot know things as they are in and of themselves, the way to know objects is to state 
those facts, that is, how the objects appear in specific contexts of experience by being observed, 
measured, probed or prompted in specific ways. To know objects by their behaviors, actions and 
reactions, or responses is tantamount to knowing facts about them, and these facts rather than the 
objects themselves ground the sciences.  
 The various particular sciences and philosophies of the special sciences can be distinguished by     
the answers they give to the general question of how objects appear in experience and how facts 
about their behaviors can add up to theoretical knowledge, e.g., knowledge of laws of nature or 
empirically adequate generalizations. For example, Galileo’s or Locke’s distinction between 
primary and secondary qualities served to exclude certain features of objects, namely those that did 
not yield to quantitative measurement. Similarly, the notion of a dispositional property served to 
 However, it could be argued that such a top-down approach, in which objects embody idealized ontological 10
frameworks, should be complemented by a more bottom-up approach, where one would investigate how research 
objects may prove able to reconfigure the overall map of knowledge, including the guiding ideals of science and 
technoscience. This is not only a purely methodological “top-down versus bottom-up” problem but concerns the status 
of ontology in respect to epistemology. Is the ontology of objects framed by a prior epistemological standpoint, or do 
the objects constrain the epistemic strategies of science and technoscience? To what extent and how exactly are 
technoscientific objects plastic to human ends and modalities of access – as opposed to the much emphasized resistance 
or recalcitrance of scientific objects? Do technoscientific attempts at mastering complexity encounter something like a 
“plastic stubbornness” of technoscientific objects? Here, different approaches come to mind, such as “existential 
pluralism” (Souriau 1943), “agential realism” (Barad 1999), or “object oriented metaphysics” (Harman 2005). This 
problem could also be addressed by reconstructing “biographies of objects” (Daston et al., 2000).
 Arguably, the ontology of facts is underpinned by an ontology of data where data are thought to be meaningless 11
unless apprehended in the shape of propositions that organize them as facts.
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distinguish the vast number of unrealized and unobserved behaviors from manifest behaviors that 
exhibit regularity and that a science of the real can take into account. What is known about the 
things are their regular behaviors so that particular things become representative samples of a class 
of objects. This theoretical knowledge of nature can then be used to design processes or devices that 
rely upon and exploit this regularity. In all of this, the encounter with the things is constrained by 
the ontology of facts as building blocks of scientific knowledge. 
 In many ways, technoscience is “face to face” with the things. It is less interested in what they     
are or what regular behaviors they are naturally disposed to exhibit, and more interested in what 
they can become or what they might offer. More immersive methods of modeling, for example, do 
not provide schematic representations but a substitute reality in which researchers encounter the 
agency of particular things in the context of particular systems, and in which arguments from the 
similarity between simulated and real system are admissible. By way of this substitute or duplicate 
reality – e.g., in silico rather than in vivo – researchers engage with their objects: They interact with 
them by physically experiencing the effect of parameter variations on their model, or by learning to 
see molecules in the manner in which molecules are said to “see” each other. If general statements 
can be inferred from this engagement they do not owe to natural lawfulness. They are established 
technically, on a case by case basis, by rendering operations more and more robust as the 
phenomena move from one laboratory to the next and through the attempts at scaling them up all 
the way to industrial production. Each of these developments can draw, of course, on given theories 
and algorithms. The further development of these theories and representational devices is not at 
issue as long as they can serve as a toolbox for modeling the potential performances of 
technoscientific objects.  
 While the representational demands of science constitute and constrain how objects can appear,     
the technoscientific approach assumes a plasticity of things that is not limited in an a priori fashion 
(Schwarz and Nordmann 2010). Just like embryonic stem cells are coveted for their “totipotent” 
capability to become any other cell, anything composed of molecules is sometimes imagined as 
capable of becoming any structure whatsoever, as in a game of lego (Bensaude-Vincent, 2009).  12
These attributed capacities are unlimited as long as the things do yield novel and promising 
properties.   13
 An extreme illustration of this point was provided by Nobel-laureate Gerd Binnig, one of the inventors of the 12
scanning-tunnelling microscope: «a rock is not a rock but could be anything else» (2004, p. 7).
 To be sure, we are not assuming that, in fact, the technosciences can overcome notions of a limited world and 13
discover unlimited resources for endless novelty and surprise. Obviously, such ideas can be criticized as technoscientific 
hubris. We do claim, however, that the notion of limits (as in conservation laws) are not constitutive for technoscientific 
research practice, while they may well be necessary preconditions for the representation of the world.
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In order to further explore this world of boundless possibility, various working hypotheses might be 
pursued. The following three provide a sampling: 
• technoscientific objects are value-laden: Technoscientific objects come into being, not by 
way of constitution within a categorical or conceptual scheme as apparently value-free 
objects but through a process of valuation (Echeverria 2003). The case of arctic ice or that of 
blood from the umbilical cord makes this point: These have been objects and perhaps objects 
of scientific interest before an assignment of value turned them into technoscientific objects, 
and now they challenge the traditional contrasts of pure and impure, morally neutral and 
socially invested. 
• technoscientific objects are performative: By becoming an object of technoscientific interest, 
an already familiar object becomes something new or something else. Indeed, its very nature 
changes in that it is no longer defined by what it is, but by its expected technical 
performance. Its structure, properties, and structure-property dependencies fade into the 
background, while potential functionalities acquired through dynamic modeling and re-
engineering take center stage. This anticipatory performativity confers a strange temporal 
status to technoscientific objects that are simultaneously “already there” and “not yet 
realized.” As such they function as proofs of concept that signify that a process or 
phenomenon has been demonstrated and at the same time refer to something that does not 
exist as yet but might come into being.  
•  technoscientific objects are familiar: When one asks about the nature of objects in the 
context of scientific research, the answer typically produces a divorce between everyday 
experience and scientific experience. Accordingly, the search for explanatory structures 
begins with a distrust of how things appear to the untutored mind. However, the epistemic 
rupture between science and lay knowledge, emphasized particularly by Gaston Bachelard 
(1938), does not seem to apply to technoscientific objects. Even where these objects originate 
in a strange world like the nanocosm, they are represented as mundane objects of human 
engineering that can be handled in effective ways and that yield a technical performance 
which can be related to imagined human purposes or alleged societal needs. Even though 
many technoscientific objects might be unobservable, in fact, they are not therefore 
“theoretical entities” that provoke debate among realists and instrumentalists, but come into 
being only to the extent that they are conceived (and visualized) as if they were 
straightforwardly observable and treated as material building blocks for new technologies. 
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• technoscientific objects have unrestricted materiality: Only some features of scientific 
objects are relevant for the pursuit of certain questions. The most famous example of this is 
the disctinction between primary and secondary qualities: If one investigates an object in 
order to understand its laws of motion, the color of the object will be neglected. For 
technoscientific objects there are no antecedent constraints regarding the material features 
that will be relevant for their exploration and understanding. It is up to explorative 
experimentation to discover which physical features of a thing might alter its behavior under 
certain conditions. 
IV.  CARBON, ONCOMOUSE, AND THE STM – THREE EXAMPLES 
General considerations of science and technoscience, and of the difference between their objects of 
research, call for a more sustained consideration of particular examples. Indeed, these programmatic 
remarks intend just that – to interest historically minded philosophers and philosophically minded 
historians or STS scholars to contribute to a collection of studies of technoscientific objects. Here, 
there is only space to offer a few reminders of objects that have received attention in recent years 
for the ontological questions they raise. 
  The first of these objects is especially significant for the fact that in the course of its long history    
it has appeared in different research contexts, allowing us to see that it is not the same object in 
these various contexts. To be sure, this is true of a great number of objects, most prominently 
perhaps the gene which began its scientific career as a hypothetical entity introduced for 
explanatory purposes and which is now a technoscientific design tool. What makes carbon an even 
more striking example is that it is such an ordinary and familiar object. In the nineteenth century, 
carbon was identified as a chemical element. In the periodic system set up by Mendeleev in 1869, it 
appears as a “typical element,” the head of a column which exemplifies the properties of its 
“family.” Although charcoal was the main pillar of the industrial revolution, Mendeleev was not 
concerned with the properties of charcoal. Rather he considered the element carbon, the basic 
substance that exists in all known allotropic forms of carbon, namely diamond, charcoal and 
graphite. Mendeleev drew a clear distinction between the abstract notion of elements and the 
concrete stuff of simple substances. Elements cannot be isolated while simple substances come into 
existence at the end of a process of analysis and purification. As an element carbon is a “separate 
homogeneous substance, the material but invisible part of compounds” (Mendeleev 1952, p. 439). It 
is a material entity notably with no essential physical features, as illustrated by its protean role in 
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the chemistry of life. It is characterized by its atomic weight, a property derived from theoretical 
views about atoms and molecules and with experimental data on the various compounds formed by 
carbon. It was precisely this abstract distinction between elements and simple substance that 
provided a clue for Mendeleev’s discovery of the periodicity of the chemical properties of elements. 
Without this abstract notion, Mendeleev could never have predicted the existence of new elements, 
before they could be isolated as simple substances – a phenomenological notion of simple substance 
would not allow predictions of unknown elements.  
 Mendeleev’s emphasis on the centrality of elements was maintained even reinforced in the early     
twentieth century with the discovery of isotopes. The periodic system served as the chart of 
chemistry, the inscription of the basic building blocks that are used by nature and simultaneously 
the revelation of a unique and general law governing the irreducible diversity of chemical 
phenomena. Elements such as carbon were significant objects of investigation when chemists were 
concerned with establishing order in the jungle of individual substances. And thus, although the 
development of quantum theory shifted the attention of chemists from the macroscopic properties of 
chemical substances to the inner structure of their atoms, the notion of elements remained 
fundamental for chemists. When the term ‘isotope’ was forged, this reaffirmed the pertinence of the 
concept of the element as a distinct chemical entity, albeit now defined in relation to the sub-atomic 
particles that are the constituents of matter. 
  From a technoscientific perspective the periodic system is seen as a kind of well-organized    
toolbox. And over the past decades of the twentieth century, carbon has been the focus of intensive 
research as a resource for the construction of potential tools for specific applications such as high-
modulus reinforcing fibers or semi-conductors. The attention has shifted from the element carbon to 
the variety of its allotropes and novel manifestations: fullerenes, nanotubes, graphene. The various 
architectures of carbon molecules have been systematically explored as potential materials for 
performing specific tasks. What used to be one of the fundamental elements of the material universe 
became a mine of materials, a vehicle of functional properties that could be useful for technological 
applications. The old familiar chemical element carbon now exists at the intersection of specific 
natural dispositions and social, economic, military, environmental concerns.  
 New instrumental techniques such as electron microscopy and scanning tunneling microscopy     
reconfigured not only the identity of carbon, but its potential at the level of individual molecules. 
Significantly, the carbon-60 fullerene structures that were discovered in the 1980s were not 
scrutinized as exotic laboratory curiosities that would shed light on the structural properties of 
carbon. In a short time, these buckyballs favored the rediscovery of the long-forgotten nanotubes. 
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These rapidly became the starting point of a race for designing single-wall and multiple-wall carbon 
nanotubes for electronic or medical technologies. Starting in 2004, graphene – a structural 
component of graphite – became a major focus of research. This isolated plane of carbon atoms is a 
thermodynamically unstable sheet of graphite. For this reason, it was not expected to exist in 
isolation from graphite. Nevertheless, once artificially isolated, it revealed to be perfectly stable. 
After the Nobel prize awarded in 2010 to Andrei Geim and Konstantin Novoselov “for 
groundbreaking experiments regarding the two-dimensional material grapheme,” the three novel 
forms of carbon were brought together in a single narrative – the story of the carbon sheet 
“unfolding itself” to visibility at increasing dimensionalities: Fullerenes (zero dimension) where 
first studied with mass spectroscopy and calculations, nanotubes (one dimension) were discovered 
with electron microscopy, and finally, graphene (two dimensions) can be observed with visible light 
microscopy. 
 Graphene is neither an elementary building block nor a bulk material. It is but a pure surface, a     
surface without bulk, a surface in itself. As a surface, it combines plasticity, sensitivity and 
reactivity, as a single layer of carbon atoms it promises regularity of structure and control – every 
atom matters but the atoms are reasonably well behaved. As a pure surface again, it has a unique 
electronic structure: an anomalous quantum-Hall effect and a zero-gap band structure; its electrons 
are massless and behave like relativistic particles describable by the Dirac equation (and not by the 
Schrödinger equation). Graphene thus also furnishes a “pocket playground” to model relativistic 
quantum mechanics. Moreover, graphene is both a nanoscale and a macroscopic object: It is part of 
the nanoworld, and part of our world, and can be engineered at both scales. It is therefore 
considered a promising substitute for silicon in information technology – while there are 
speculations about silicon-based lifeform.  
 All this suggests that carbon is an attractive object to scientists and technoscientists alike. What     
makes it attractive, however, is different at different times and in different contexts. As a pure 
element it holds a key to the constitution of matter and of life – it is an elusive building block 
behind the appearances. And as a carrier of functional properties it holds the promise of material 
proliferation and of technologies to be – its protean character epitomizes the plasticity of nature, 
that is, its malleability to human ends.  
 In contrast to inconspicuous carbon, oncomouseTM is the posterchild of “hybridity.” Along with     
other transgenic laboratory animals it has gotten considerable attention as a new kind of research 
object that transgresses the categories of the natural and the artificial, of living organism and 
constructed thing, of physis and techne. Indeed, any investigation of the ontology of technoscientific 
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objects is likely to begin by pronouncing that these objects are hybrids. However, philosophical 
analysis has to move beyond this finding and should not mistake it for a profound insight. The 
transgression of received categorical distinctions can only be an effect that accompanies the 
ontological character of an object. To say that the oncomouse is simultaneously a living organism 
and a constructed thing is only to conjure an air of paradox and serves to show that it eludes 
familiar distinctions which do not therefore have to be surrendered (see Schiemann 2005; compare 
Dupuy 2010). For all its fame, therefore, the oncomouse still deserves close scrutiny. Only some of 
its features shall be mentioned here. 
 The oncomouse is usually considered a “model” but what kind of model is it, and if it is a model,     
what does this tell us about modeling? Several overlapping distinctions have been proposed – that 
between animal model and model animal, between being a model of and a model for, between 
serving as representation of a denoted reality and allowing immersion in a substitute reality (see, 
e.g., Keller 2000, Gzil 2007, Nordmann 2006). All these distinctions revolve around features of the 
oncomouse that become salient in different contexts of its design and use. If the mouse is to develop 
a kind of cancer that also occurs in humans, its design requires a physical correspondence between 
the human cancer and the mouse cancer, and its designers will therefore be able to account for that 
correspondence, e.g., by referring to the pertinent genes that are responsible for the expression of 
the tumor. For the biomedical researchers who study cellular processes and seek ways to suppress 
tumor development, these questions of correspondence drop out of the picture entirely. Instead, they 
may well spend their entire career studying the oncomouse, seeking a way to treat cancer in a 
creature that has been engineered to have that cancer. For these researchers, the oncomouse cancer 
is not a model of human cancer, just as little as the oncomouse is a model of a human being. For 
them, the oncomouse is a model for biochemical tinkering, that is, a substitute reality that exhibits 
certain behaviors which are subject to practical influence – a reality, therefore, to engage with in a 
sustained, intimate, immersive manner. And yet, this immersive engagement with the material 
reality of the oncomouse is thought to promote the discovery of therapies for human cancer. What is 
done for the treatment of the oncomouse is simultaneously for the treatment of the human cancer – 
not because the genetic structure of the mouse cancer somehow depicts the genetic structure of the 
human cancer, but on the assumption that the mouse cancer is the human cancer and vice versa: The 
oncomouse participates in the reality of the human cancer patient. And this may be an important 
ontological feature of the oncomouse: It is what it is in terms of its physiology and material reality, 
and beyond that it is also the bearer of a disease process by virtue of the participation, jointly, of 
mouse and human in a shared reality. The oncomouse as model animal is thus set off from 
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representational models and at the same time moved into the vicinity of computer simulations, 
experimental systems, and even of the magical thinking that can also be found in voodoo 
practices.   14
 All this is further complicated or perhaps amplified by the fact that at least in the case of the     
oncomouse, this notion of participation cannot be reduced to instantiation: The cancer of the 
oncomouse is not an instance of human cancer. This becomes evident when one considers the 
following difference: A human being may have a natural disposition to develop cancer, but the 
cancer in the mouse is an engineered affordance. The notion of dispositional property to respond to 
a stimulus-condition supports the work of purification: The external, perhaps technical or 
environmental stimulus is distinct from the natural or automatic response to that stimulus. In a 
classical scientific experiment, for instance, the scientists or experimenters actively construct the 
instrumental set-up and provide a stimulus condition, and then they step back to become mere 
passive observers of the way in which the system naturally responds to the stimulus. Similarly, if a 
human being has a disposition to develop cancer, any number of processes or events might serve as 
stimuli, but once this likely or unlikely event has occurred, it is thought to be in the nature of that 
human being to develop that cancer. The oncomouse does not instantiate this dynamic. It does not 
require a stimulus to develop cancer but does so simply through its existence or by its very nature 
where that nature, however, is specifically designed to suit human research purposes. When a thing 
delivers an effect, performance, or service to its user, one speaks of an affordance.  Affordances 15
resist the work of purification: It is in the “nature” of the oncomouse to afford a cancerous tumor 
just as it is in the “nature” of a bicycle to afford a kind of transport.  16
 Once the oncomouse is seen as a material system in its own right that participates in the reality     
of other things, and once this relation is understood as an engineered affordance rather than a mere 
 It might appear far-fetched to speak of “magical thinking“ in respect to technoscientific research practice. But the far-14
fetched comparison makes a point about inferences from the similarity of two physical systems, e.g., from the similarity 
of cancer in the oncomouse and a human, or from the similarity of a dynamic behavior in silico and in vivo (of a 
simulation model in a computer and of a physical process in an experimental system). Precisely because these 
similarities are constructed with the help of research technologies, one can take them as indicative of a shared reality 
that makes these systems similar. (Compare to this the skeptical rejection of inferences from similarity in modern 
theories of knowledge: similarity judgments are thought to be reducible to statements of the form “identical in specific 
respects, different in other respects” and not to signify anything sui generis – see Goodman1972 in contrast to Foucault 
1973, esp. pp. 17-25).
 “In many cases the outcome of activating a disposition does not depend on any particular human situation, interest, or 15
construction. However, in some cases the phenomenon has a specifically human aspect. Compare the generic outcome 
that ice of a certain thickness can bear a certain weight per unit area, expressed in a generic disposition, with the claim 
that ice of that thickness affords walking for a person. Generalizing the notion of an affordance we can say that an 
apparatus/world complex can afford things. For instance, wheat, yeast, and a stove can afford loaves of bread. A lathe 
can afford chair legs, and a discharge tube can afford gamma rays.[…] The phenomena that are produced in an 
[apparatus/world complex] are the manifestations of affordances. These are dispositions that bring together two sets of 
causal powers that cannot be disentangled. There are the powers of the material stuff organized as an apparatus and the 
powers of the world realized in the phenomena.“ (Rom Harré 2003, pp. 37f.) 
 Here the concept of “nature” follows an Aristotelian conception whereby every thing has its own nature and no longer 16
refers to a homogeneous space of lawful regularities.
!17
instantiation of a natural process, one sees how the oncomouse is heavily invested with human 
values and purposes. This is, indeed, how the oncomouse was popularized by Donna Haraway 
(1997). Indeed, Haraway suggests that the oncomouse is perhaps not an object of research at all but 
a subject: The mouse performs a sacrifice for human beings; it was dispatched by us into the war 
against cancer, and now it acts on our behalf and dies for us in this war. If objectivity consists in 
gaining a proper distance, the subjectivity of the oncomouse and its investment with human value 
and purpose presents a challenge to the philosophy of technoscience. If it cannot be secured through 
intersubjective agreement on detached representations, it must originate in its material character and 
the technical robustness of its performance. 
 Our third example of a technoscientific object is most readily recognizable as such and may     
prove to be a source or warrant of objectivity. The scanning tunneling microscope (STM) is the 
research technology that is said to enable nanotechnology and is to this date probably the most 
effective and transformative nanotechnology, if only because it contributed to the transformation of 
research practice. The STM brings about a new instrumental concept in microscopy: near-field 
probing. It consists of approaching the object as closely as possible in order to pick-up the 
information at the surface of the sample. As one of the pioneers of probe microscopy relates, 
“traditional scientists shunned this method because its intimacy was seen as a violation of 
objectivity and distance, a gospel of 19th-century science and epistemology” (Gimzewski 2008, p. 
260). The very functioning of the STM itself induces a ‘collapse of distance’ (Nordmann 2006). 
 Despite its name, the scanning tunneling microscope is an apparatus of manipulation as much as     
of observation – not only in the sense in which observation always requires some intervention, but 
more straightforwardly in the sense that it can be used to construct the structure that it then subjects 
to observation. The STM is both a tool and an instrument, or best: it is an interesting instrument 
because it is a tool (it individualizes some atomic features of the sample by establishing a sort-
circuit between them and the atoms of the tip). And conversely, it is an interesting tool because it is 
an instrument (it enables collecting data of our intervention in the nanoworld under the form of 
“manipulation signals”). Finally, it brings together the sensory modalities of touch, hearing, and 
sight.   17
 Ian Hacking’s question whether we see through (or with) a microscope served to determine the     
standing of the instrument as an object entrenched in observational practices, especially by being 
calibrated to other observational tools (Hacking 1981).  This entrenchment provides individual 18
observers with a warrant regarding the trustworthy of their more or less inferential visualizations.  
 See Mody/Lynch 2010; Hennig 2006 and 2011; Soentgen 2006; Baird/Shew 2004; Shinn 2008.17
 This and the next paragraph have been adapted from Nordmann 2010a.18
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 But what if we ask whether we see through a scanning tunnelling microscope? In answer to this     
question, another interesting feature of scanning probe microscopy becomes significant, namely its 
twofold calibration or immediacy. First of all, experimenting with the STM is always seeking 
immediacy: Probing in the near-field means going where the object is and recording the very 
immediate and local interaction of the object with the instrument’s tip. For the purpose of 
‘explanation’ the ectoplasm-like images and the manipulation signals that constitute the rough data 
are then compared with those produced by a simulation of the whole experimental setup. These 
simulations use models that are calibrated to make theories fit with the experiment. They do not test 
theories. Rather, they simulate the interpretation of theories in a back-and-forth process with the 
experiment, until the two present a sufficiently satisfactory likeness.  And secondly, once this 19
interpretation is done, it is rendered user-friendly by producing a visual kind of immediacy: The 
rough image is reprocessed numerically with the kind of topographic software that is used in 
geography, simulation modelling and video gaming – this software is best suited for the 
representation of what goes on at the surface of a body. Atoms, molecules and surfaces are thus 
depicted as familiar objects with colours, shadows, foreground and background. Aside from 
providing the pleasure of experiencing a very familiar-looking space that stands ready to be 
colonised by nanotechnology, it stacks the deck in favour of inferences from the likeness of STM-
images and the visualisations of computer simulations.  
 Tellingly, this twofold immediacy makes the STM conceptually even more complicated but     
perceptually even simpler than electron microscopy. In a recent interview, one of the inventors of 
the STM notes as the most striking feature of nanotechnology that for a new generation of scientists 
‘playing with atoms’ has become perfectly straightforward (Binnig 2009) – because perceptual ease 
and ease of manipulation makes one forget the conceptually complicated inferential structure. 
 If one reconsiders the history of ‘seeing with microscopes’ one might say that much of it was     
concerned with realism or truth: Straightforward seeing is associated with seeing how things are, 
whereas a highly theory-laden and inferential mode of perception suggests that what we see is a 
construct of sorts.  The reliability of a way of seeing – with the electron microscope, for example – 20
was judged in comparison to apparently straightforward cases of immediate perception. Calibration, 
for example, provides a warrant to the effect that one can trust the microscope as much as one 
 This first production of immediacy can be said to be ‘analogic’ in two senses: it is based on the STM’s operation as an 19
analogue to sensing, and it takes recourse to analogies between the experiment and the model.
 To be sure, more sustained reflections of microscopy indicate that the question about realism and truth is based on a 20
misleading dichotomy. For much instrument-aided observation one can say that it does not provide straightforward 
access to something given, but that it is not therefore an inferential construction of something constructed or contrived.
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normally trusts one’s naked eyes. In contrast, the reliability of observations with the STM does not 
depend on representational features but on the technical robustness and performance of the system. 
Seeing with the STM cannot be likened to a human observer who confronts an outside reality and 
wonders whether a mental image provides a truthful representation – owing to the fact that the STM 
is an instrument of intervention as well as observation, a tool and an instrument, and due to its 
twofold calibration. Instead, the STM is coordinated with a multitude of other instruments and 
procedures and is judged by the way it agrees with and improves upon a whole system of 
observational and experimental techniques. Firmly entrenched in a variety of contexts and practices, 
the STM is not a method of seeing atoms on surfaces but an apparatus/world complex that affords 
perceptual and manipulative access to atoms and molecules on surfaces.  21
V.  OUTLOOK 
More questions, hypotheses, and examples could be offered at this point. But the proof of the 
pudding is not in the quantity of suggestive considerations. It consists in sustained analyses of 
particular research practices and their objects. We began by referring to Moritz Schlick, William 
Whewell, or Ludwig Wittgenstein to articulate an ontology of scientific facts which views the 
things from a representational distance and considers objects only as they occur in states of affairs. 
In this context, we also included accounts of dispositional properties and did not thereby exhaust the 
scope of philosophical reflection on the ontology of scientific objects. As our research-project 
unfolds, Ludwik Fleck, Norwood Russell Hanson, and Thomas Kuhn would need to be considered, 
Quine’s famous dictum that “to be is to be the value of a variable,” (Quine 1980), Wilfried Sellars, 
Gilbert Ryle, Donald Davidson, and Nelson Goodman, but also Nancy Cartwright and Ian Hacking, 
and all who consider the ontological difficulties introduced by quantum physics or string theory 
(compare Balashov 2010). Our analysis of scientific objects should this be informed by the rich 
tradition of what has come to be known as analytic philosophy, but it might also take its inspiration 
from Emile Meyerson, Gaston Bachelard, or Alfred North Whitehead. 
 The analysis of technoscientific objects need not begin empty-handed, either. For it, too, we hope     
to draw on a variety of philosophical traditions. In order to gain perspective on the many faultlines 
like the one between facts and things, it might be useful to go back to Aristotle, Leibniz, Locke or 
Husserl. Francis Bacon has been rediscovered as a major philosopher of science and technoscience, 
 Compare Rom Harré’s account of the difference between instruments that function like probes (the thermometer, the 21
light microscope) and a complex of apparatus and world that makes a phenomenon available for research and 
development, for observation and intervention. As we saw above, he says of the latter complexes that they afford a thing 
or an activity (Harré 2003).
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and we can consider his conception of the objects of research. The same can be said for 
philosophers of nature and of technology like Henri Bergson or Gilbert Simondon, Martin 
Heidegger or, perhaps, John Dewey. Also, some of the authors who elucidate the ontology of 
scientific research objects also contribute to an investigation of technoscience – Ludwik Fleck and 
Alfred North Whitehead come to mind. Finally, the Science Studies literature of the last several 
decades offers many insights that can inform philosophical analysis (e.g., Mol 1999; Latour 1987, 
1999, 2004; Stengers 2010; Verbeek 2000, 2005; Rabinow 1997). 
 We started with a quote from Moritz Schlick that expressed the scientific demand to recognize     
the nature and not the value of things and therefore to keep our distance from them. If only to 
underscore that one cannot engage in a philosophy of technoscience without bringing in 
philosophers who have been marginalized, if not excluded by the philosophy of science, we 
conclude with a quote from John Dewey’s Experience and Nature. In contrast to Schlick, it 
formulates the need to be engaged in order to realize the value of things through technoscientific 
research. Seeking to elucidate the “instrumental nature of the objects of scientific knowing” (p. 
xvii), Dewey mocks the tendency of philosophers first to oppose subject and object, mind and 
matter and then to ask “how the acts of mind can reach out and lay hold of objects defined in 
antithesis of them” (p. 12). Received conceptions of science highlight theoretical security and 
certainty, whereas a conception of things in the context of human practice will foreground the 
practical task of finding what is recurrent and stable (p. xv) – rather than juxtapose nature and 
culture, it accounts for the experience of things as shaped by custom, tradition, expectation, 
language, and as a matter of human interest: 
The office of physical science is to discover those properties and relations of things in virtue of 
which they are capable of being used as instrumentalities; physical science lays claim not to 
disclose the inner nature of things but only those connections of things with one another that 
determine outcomes and hence can be used as means. The intrinsic nature of events is revealed in 
experience as the immediately felt quality of things. (p. xvi) 
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